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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property rights are an important  element of the new theories of endogenous
growth.  Because  of their special relationship to human capital, intellectual property protection
may influence innovative activity and technological progress in critical ways, An  important
question for many countries is whether stricter enforcement of inteliectual property is a good
stratesl for economic growth.
This paper exariines the role of intellectual property rights in economic growtl\  utilizing
cross-country  data on patent protection, trade regime, and country-specific characteristics. The
evidence suggests  that intellectual property protection is positively related to economic growth.
These effects appear to be slightly stronger in relatively open economies  and are robust to both
the measure  of openness  used  and to other alternative  model specifications.
'We thank  Ashish  Arora, Zsolt Becsi,  John Duca,  Joe Haslag,  Samuel  Kortum, Keith
Maskus, Mark Spiegel, Mark  Wynne, and Roy Ruffin  for extremely helpful comments. We also
appreciate  the comments  of participants  in the Engines  of Economic  Growth session  at the 1994
Econometric  Society  Meetings  in Boston.  AII remaining  errors  are our own. The views
elpressed  in the paper do not necessarily  reflect those  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas  or
the Federal  Reserve  Svstem.The Role of Intellectual  Pmperty Rights in Economic Gmwth
I. Intro duction
Explanations  of economic  growth  have  increasingly  lbcused  on the role of innovation  and
on the power of expected  profits to motivate  innovation  (Grossman  and Helpman, 1991;  Romer,
1990b). Meanwhile,  policy makers  are debating  whether  stronger  protection of intellectual
property will  stimulate or retard growth in their countries.  If  innovation is a principal engine of
growth and agents innovate to capture or hold a share of the market they would not retain
otherwise, then protection  of intellectual property might boost long-run growth.
An  important  question, however, is whether intellectual property protection is always
consistent with innovation and higher growth.  If  agents  innovate to capture or hold a share of
the market they would not retain otherwise, what happens if they can retain their share of the
market without bothering to innovate?  What if, for example,  agents,  markets in a country were
protected  from competition? using a survey  of more than 3,000  Brazilian  companies,  Braga  and
Willmore (1991)  found that firms' propensities  to develop  their own technolory  or to purchase  it
abroad  were both negatively  related  to the degree  of trade  protectionism  their industries
enjoyed. Braga  and Wilknore's empirical  work suggests  that, in closed  regimes,  protecting
intellectual property may not increase innovation because  the competitive framework there is
inadequate  to stimulate  much innovation. Rivera-Batiz  and Romer (1991)  offer a theoretical
model that suggests  similar conclusions.  In their model, copying foreign technolory in a closed
regime is typically tlre most profitable option.
By contrast,  in open trade regimes  there is reason  to suspect  that intellectual  property
protection may stimulate  innovation  and,  thereby,  growth. open trade implies  that local firms
are more likely to face  competition  from foreign  producers  that use  the latest  technolory  both in
their production  processes  and in their products. Local firms that wish to meet this challenge  by
purchasing  technologr  tiom abroad  can  find that weak intellectual  property protection  at home2
impedes their efforts.  Foreign technolory-producing firms often refuse to license or lease their
latest  innovations  to firms in countries  where intellectual  property  protection  is weak,  out of
concern  that the licensing  contract  will not ultimately  prove enforceable  (sherwood,  1990).
This paper exarnines  the role of intellectual property rights in economic growth, utilizing
cross-country data on overall levels of patent protection, trade regime, and country-specific
characteristics. we  find that intellectual property protection (as rneasured  by the degree of
patent protection)  is positively related to economic growth.  These effects appear to be slightly
stronger in relativeiy open economies and are robust to both the measure of openness  used aad
to other alternative  model specifications.
Our findings sugge.st  that the links between intellectual property rights, innovation, and
growth may be influenced by market structure.  Although  our results do not fully capture all of
the subtleties of market structure, they suggest  that innovation may play a weaker role in less
competitive  markets.
These results have potentially important  implications for developing countries.  Many
countdes, particularly those in Latin America, have been turning away from trade protectionism
and are moving toward liberalization.  While some countries, such as Mexico, are liberalizing
and rapidly tightening their intellectual property protection, others are moving more slowly to
strengthen  intellectual  property protection. The implication of this paper,  however,  is that a
trade  liberalization  accompanied  by stronger  intellectual  property protection  is a stronger
conduit for economic  grofih.
The next section  of this paper discusses  how intellectual  property rights  vary across
countries  and how they may,  or may not, be related to increased  innovation. Thereafter,  we
develop  more fully the implications  of innovation  in an endogenous  growth  theory  context.
Finally,  we present  our empirical  findings  on intellectual  property rights  protection  andeconomic  growth.
II.  Intellectual  Pmperty Rights Protection
Because  products of the intellect are tlpically  non-rival, intellectual property law
incorporates an inherent tension between private gain and public welfare,  That is, once such a
product has been created, it can be used by many parties besides  the creator at little  additional
cost. To motivate innovation, governments try to ensure that inventors can profit  from
inventing.  But protecting innovators too stringently may limit  the dissemination of new ideas
and, therefore, opportunities for economic growth.l
We consider in more detail below the optimal level of intellectual property protection by
focusing on the arguments for weak and strong intellectual property protection.
The Case  for Weak Protection
Free access  to ihformation  that agents  would otherwise have to pay for is one, but not
the only, argument for weak intellectual property protection.  Another  argument involves the
monopolistic  behavior  that strong  protection  permits. It has  been  shown  that under some
conditions, a monopoly may accumulate patents to preserve its power by allowing the patents to
"sleep"  so as to deter entry into  an industry (Giibert  and Newbery  19g2).
The argument that firms innovate-in  part-to  secure  monopoly power has particularly
compelling  implications  for developing  country  policies. Chin and Grossman  (1990)
demonstrate conditions under which the globally efficient degree of intellectual property
protection  does  not necessarily  maximize  every  country's  welfare. Here again,  the enforcement
of protection  mitigates  competition  and may replace  it with monopolistic  behavior. In net
'In virtually all countries  this problem is addressed  by allowing  patents  to expire  after a
period of time.  It is interesting  to note that developing  countrieJhive tradition:ally  offered
shorter  periods  of protection for patents  than have  developed  countries.4
innovation-consuming  countries,  the cost of monopolization  can  more than offset  the
contribution  of stronger  intellectual  property  protection toward stimulating  more cost-saving
innovations.'?
Likewise,  under conditions  presented  by Diwan and Rodrik (1991),  the net innovarion-
consuming country will only be motivated to protect intellectual property as long as the type of
innovation it demands  is different from the rype demanded in the net innovation-producing
country.  If the consuming country demands  innovations that af,e  very different from those
produced by the innovating country, the innovating country will still innovate on behal{ of the
consuming country if the consuming country protects intellectuai property.
From the perspective of net innovation-consuming countries that also wish to encourage
innovation at home, another axgument  against strong intellectual property protection relates to
institutional  structures  in which innovations  are produced  and distributed. Vessuri  (1990)  argues
that transnational  computer  corporations  located  in Brazil were not interested  in developrng  or
absorbing local technolory because  they typically restricted their research and development to
home country locations.  So, instead of protecting intellectual property, Brazil attempted to
foster local innovation by reserving a portion  of its market for domestic producers of mini- and
microcomputers  and their peripherals.,
The Case  for Strong  Protection
Why offer strong intelleetual property protection?  Survey evidence suggests  that, at least
in the United states,  protection  stimulates  innovation  (Mansfield,  1986) and the social  rate of
'  The degree  to which the consuming  country  is motivated  not to protect is, in part,
inversely  related to the relative size  of its market.
'An additional  argument  against  strong  intellectual  property laws  in net consuming  countries
is that enforcement  costs  can be very high (Primo Braga,  1990). Foreigners  hold the bulk of
patents  in developing  countries,  so enforcement  costs  may simp$ lead to increased  royalty  gains
for foreigners  and greater  royalty expenses  for nationals.return aPpears  to be considerably  higher  than the rate of return to the innovator  (Mansfield,
Rapoport, Romeo, wagner, and Beardsley, 1977). rn a Brazilian survey, g0 percent of 327 firms
said  they  would invest  more in internal research  and  would improve  training for their employees
if better legai  protection  were available  (Sherwood,  1990).
Moreover, despite arguments that strong intellectual property protection significantly
enhances  the monopoly  power of producers  in some  maxkets,  it does  not appear  that patent
protection-the  strongest form  of intellectual property protection-has  often prevented
competitors from entering markets in developed countries for very Iong (Evenson, 1990; Levin,
Klevorich  Nelson and winter,  1987). Firms surveyed  by Mansfield (1985) beliwed  that, for
about hal-f of a selected  sample of innovations, patent protection deterred imitation  by
competitors for only a few months.a
An  additional case  for strong intellectual property protection is that, without  it, the
technologr acquirable may not cosr much but it wiii be old  (Maclaughlin,  Richards, and Kenny,
1988,  106). Productive  processes,  on average,  will be more bachrard than in regimes  of strong
intellectual property protection.5 A  net innovation-consuming country that does not protect
intellectual property can a.ffect  its fkms'  ability to purchase technolory, even when they are
I  These findings do not completely gainsay  the monopolization argument, even though they
weaken  it somewhat.  Schankerman  (1991:  z8), in an econometric  study  of French  patenls
(including patents to applicants from Germany, the united  Kingdom, iapan, and the united
states, as well as.  France)  finds that "the property rights generated by th;  patent system  confer
sizeable  ec-onomic  rents on patentees.  On thl  average,  thlse rents  aie equivalent  io subsidy  rate
to R&D of about 15  percent. Hence  patent  protection is a significant  source  of returns to
inventive  effort, but it does  not appear  to be the major one..
'They may also be simpler.  A  United  Nations study notes that if ,,the technical services,
management  experience  and capital  resources  as  well as  other connections  of the foreisn
patentee  himseH  are essential  for the introduction  of the patented  process  in the undei-
developed  country,  basically  the  situation  is that  in one  form or other  the  minimum  terms  and
conditions  of the foreign patentee  must be met if the innovation  is to be broueht  to the under-
developed  country" (United Nations,  1964,50).b
willing to pay for it.  When dealing with firms in such countries, foreign producers of technologr
are cautious  about  selling  it, out of concern  that the prospective  buyers  may  violate  purchasing
agreements  with impunity.6
A  final motivation for consuming  nations to protect intellectual pfoperty is that
innovation-producing countries may retaliate against those with weak intellectual property
protection. Indeed,  it has  been  argued  that the recent  move  of some  developing  nations  toward
stronger  intellectual  property protection  may be a direcl response  to U.S.  trade retaliation  over
the last decade  (Gadbaw  and Richards,  1988).
III.  Intellectual  Property Rights and Economic Growth Theory
While the discussion  above suggests  much about the interaction between intellectual
property rights and innovation, little  has been mentioned about the dynamic process  of
innovation, which  is the backbone of many new theories of endogenous  growth.  So far, the
theoretical literature  on intellectual property rights, innovation, and economic growth has been
quite Limited,  while the empirical  work on economic  growth-such  as  that of Baro  (1991),
Romer (1990a),  Mankiw, Romer,  and Weil (1992),  kvine  and Renelt (1992)--has  yet to
examine the relationship between inteilectual property rights and economic growth.  This section
relates  intellectual  property  rights  protection to endogenous  growth  theories.
Several popular models of endogenous  growth are based on the idea that innovation is
6Sherwood  (1990)  cites  anecdotal  evidence  in which a Brazilian  firm,s emolovees  have
approached  companies  abroad  to gain cost-effective  technolory,  but that negotiations  with the
foreign source  often came  to an abrupt end when tlle source  learned  of Brazii's  weak  protection
for innovation. The representative  interviewed  by Sherwood  noted that his employees  no longer
try to keep up with technological  advances  abroad,  since  the information wi.L[  do them little
qooo.I
carried  out to make  profits on the introduction of new  products.t But every  new  product adds
to the stock  of human knowledge,  so the cost of innovation  falls as  human  knowledge
accumulates. Thus, the rate of growth of the eronomy will vary directly with the rate of
introduction  of new  products  such  as  the automobile  or personal  computer. Moreover,
economic growth will  also be faster the larger is the stock of human capital or the more
conducive the economic environment to the accumulation of human knowledge. By creating an
ehvironment conducive to the accumulation of human knowledge, intellectual property rights will
tend to increase innovation ald  economic growth.
Economic growth may also depend on the openness  of an economy. The work of Paul
Romer (1990b) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, 235-46)  suggests  that if  externalities are
international in scope,  then economic integration will increase economic growth.  With  openness,
a country's economic growth depends on the stock of world human capital; accordingly, higher
stocks of human capital in a country should have only a slight marginal impact on economic
growth in that country.  Likewise, intellectual property rights protection would also have a small
marginal impact on that country's growth rate.  However from a global standpoint, human
capital accumulation and intellectual property rights protection would be very important to
economic  growth.
In other endogenous  growth models, there is a dl,namic sector that exhibits learning-by-
doing externalities, spillover effects, or other human-capital-type externalities and a traditional
sector  that does  not.8 Depending  on whether  free trade shifts  resources  to or away  from the
?See,  e.g.,  Lucas (1988),  Romer (1990b),  and Grossman  and Helpman (1991).
_ 
3See,  for example,  Lucas  (1988),  Rivera-Batiz  and Romer (1991),  Stokey  (1991),  and young
(1991).  Grossman  and Helpman (1991)  create  a two-factor,  thiee-sector  endogenous  growth
open  economy  model by including  a research  and development  sector,  a high-technologSr  good,
and a traditional sood.6
dynamic  sector,  economic  growth may  increase  or decrease.  How resources  are allocated  under
free trade depends,  of course,  on the structure  of the model and a country's  initial factor
endowments. While intellectual property rights protection would clearly enhance  growth in
those countries that move toward free trade and have a comparative advantage  in the high-
technologl sector, its role in a country with a disadvantage  in the high+echnology sector would
be less  important.
Although there are many theoretical models of 
,innovation 
and growtl,  and static models
of intellectual property rights and income, relatively few papers have modeled the dynamic
effects  of intellectual  property  rights and growth. Segerstrom,  Anant, and Dinopoulos  (1990)
examine a dynamic general equilibrium model in which research and development (R&D)
activity and, hence, technological change  is influenced by the length of patent protection and the
height of  tariffs.  They find that increasing the length of patents in the North  (the innovating
region) can either incr€ase or decrease  R&D  activity.  Although longer patents increase  the
return to R&D,  they may also mean that more fixed resources  will be devoted to producing
existing  products.  Segerstrom  (1991)  examines  the dynamic  process  of innovation  and imitation
and conditions under which government lump-sum subsidies  to innovation (or imitation)  alter
the rate of innovation.
Building on the work of Grossman  and Helpman (1991),  Helpman (1993)  models
intellectual property rights, innovation, and economic growth as an interaction between countries
in the North  that innovate and countries in the South that imitate.  The stronger the level of
intellectual  property rights,  the less  imitation there is in the South. He finds that strong
intellectual property rights will increase innovation in the short run as the profitabitity  of
innovation  in the North increases.  In the longer  run, however,  the rate of innovation  actually
falls because  the North produces  more old-technolory  goods,  which takes  resources  away  fromv
innovation.
Although the theoretical  literature suggests  many  possible  mechanisms  for innovation
and growth,  it does  not suggest  any clear-cut  relationship  between  intellectual  property rights,
trade regime, and economic growth.  We attempt to discover the central facts and then suggest  a
tentative  explanation.
lV. Intellectual  Properf  and Econonic  Gro*th:  The Results
The Benchmark Model
Before examining the role of intellectual property rights in economic growth, we first
present the results of a basic benchmark growth model. The model utilizes a formulation  that is
common to many of the recent cross-country empirical examinations of growth.,  Equation 1 of
Table 1 presents the estimation results of the benchmark rnodel.lo The dependent variable is the
average  annual  real pef capita  gross  domestic  product (GDP) growth  rate between  1960  and
1988,"  and the expianatory  variables  are 1) the log of real GDp per capita  in i960,  ln(y60); 2)
physical capital savings,  which is the log of the share of investment in gross  domestic proouct,
ln(I/V);  and 3) a proxy for human  capital savings-the  log of secondary-school  enrollment  rates
in 1960,  In(SEC).u
'See,  for example,  Kormendi and Meguire (1985),  Barro (1991),  Romer (1990a),  Levine and
Renelt (1992),  Edwards  (1992),  Roubini and Sala-i-Martin  (1992),  Backus,  Kehoe,  and Kehoe
(1992),  and Mankiw, Romer,  and Weil (1992).
tofhe benchmark  model utilizes  a log-linear  formulation for two reasons:  1) it has  a basis  in
Cobb-Douglas  production  technologies  (e.g.,  Backus,  Kehoe,  and Kehoe, 1992  and Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil,  1992),  and 2) this model is superior to a simple linear formulation in
minimizing  the mean  squared  error.
"Least squares  estimates  are used  because  they are less  sensitive  to the end  points of the
growth  period.
11See  the appendix  for a list of all the data sources.10
The results  of the benchmark  model are consistent  with most recent  growth  studies.
ReaI GDP per working-age  person  in 1960  is negative  and highly  significant,  suggesting  income
convergence  conditional on human capital.t'  Physical  capital savings  and the proxy for human
capital  savings,  ln(I/Y)  and ln(SEC),  are.positive  and significant  at the 1 percent  level,
consistent  with Levine and Renelt (1992)  .
Equation 2 of Table 1 examines  the role of the stock of human capital, as proxied by
literacy rates, in economic growth.  We specifically examine the stock of human capital to
account for any scale effects that human capital may have in economic growth as suggested  by
the endogenous  growth  literature. Our proxy  for the stock  of human  capital  is the literacy  rate
in the early 1960s. As model 2 shows,  the coefficient on the stock of human capital, ln(LIT60),
has a large standard error but it  still contributes to the explanatory power of the model as shown
by the higher adjusted  F2.  Holding all else  constant,  the point estimate  suggests  that a country
with a literary rate in 1960  that was  fi  percentage  points higher  than average  would have  grown
about 1 percentage  point per year faster than average. Furthermote, notice that when the
literacy rate is included in the benchmark grofih  equation, the coefficient on total savings  falls
by 0.2 (model 1 versus  model 2).r' This result  suggests  that both variables,  to some  degree,  may
be accounting for scale effects of human capital in economic growth.
Intellectual  Property Rights and Economic Growth
Can intellectual property explain any variation in economic growth once human capital
"Although  regressing  average  growth rates against initial  income levels suggests  income
convergence,  it does  not necessarily  provide statistical  evidence  of convergence.  Quah (1990)
and Friedman (1992)  note that, because  of regression  to the mean,  a negativ€  relationship
between  average  growth  rate and initial income  does  not necessarily  provide statistical  evidence
of convergence.
'nutilizing the White test,  we could  not find evidence  to suggest  that heteroscedasticity  is a
significant  problem.77
and other determinants  of growth  are held constant? Before  we examine  this question,  we first
discuss  how intellectual  property rights  are measured.
Optimally, a complete picture of a country's intellectual property rights protection would
include measures  of copyright protection, trade secret laws, and patents.  But even when one has
measures  of all of these aspects  of intellectual property law, countries may enforce these laws
quite differently.  Two countries may have identical laws on their books to protect computer
sbftware, but one country may turn a blind eye to its local software pirates while the other
country  does  not.  On the other hand,  even  if a country does  not have  laws  on its books  to
protect intellectual property, it may nonetheless  protect intellectual property by assuming  it falls
under the same laws as physical property.  These are some of the diffrculties in obtaining a
comprehensive  index of intellectual property rights protection.
. Rather than attempting to obtain a complete and comprehensive  index of intellectual
property rights  protection,  we focus  on an aspect  of intellectuai  property protection  that is
potentially  the most important for economic  growth-patent protection. The proxy  for
intellectual property rights we use is taken from  an index of patent protection developed  by
Rapp and Rozek (1990). The index  is based  on the conformity of each  nation,s  patent  Iaws  to
the minimum standards  proposed n  the Guidelines  for Standards  for the protection and
Enforcement  of Patents of the U.s. charnber of commerce Intellectual property Task Force.r5
For most countries,  the level  of patent  protection is measured  in the early 1960s.
The index  ranks  the level  of patent  protection on a scale  of one to six,  where  one is
'5In  constructing  their index,  Rapp and Rozek (1990)  based  their procedure  on that found in
Gadbaw  and Richards,  (i988) pp. 11,52-55. The evaluarion  of the extenr  of patent  protection
and the resulting  index  value  are based  primarily on the laws  in force against  infringement  but
not on their enforcement  or implementation. Thus,  they  will ovefestimate  the level  of
protection in a country  where  strong  anti-infringement  laws  are on the books  but do not work in
practice  because  of administrative  obstacles.assigned  to a nation having  no patent  protection  law at all and six corresponds  to nations  whose
laws  are fully consistent  with the minimum standards.  For example,  the procedure  gives  a score
of two on the patent  protection scale  for Argentina. Argentina  does  have  a patent law and the
duration of protection  under the law is 15  years  from the date  of the gant.  According  to Rapp
and Rozek, however, the combination of high inflation  and a maximum fine fixed in 1864  means
that there is no practical penalty for infringement.  Moreover, the law makes no provision for
preliminary injunctions.  Thus, enforcement is nearly impossible. By contrast, Singapore
registers and protects patents under the united  Kingdom patents Act.  compulsory licensing
may be ganted  three years after registration for certain classes  of invention when the invention
is being neither practiced nor imported.  The government retains the right to exclude
pharmaceutical patents for its own purposes, but in all other respects  patents are enforceable.
Singapore, accordingly, is given a score of five on the patent protection inder.
Table 2 shows  the countries in the data set, their level of patent protection, and the
average  growth rate across  countries at each level ofthe  patent protection.  Without  controlling
for other important  determinates of growth, those countries with the highest level of intellectual
proPerty  rights protection  tended  to grow the fastest. However,  those  countries  with the second
lowest level of patent protection grew faster on average than those countries in the middle levels
of patent  protection. Overall there does  appear  to be a positive  but weak relationship  between
patent protection  and economic growth.  There are many other factors that should be taken into
account before any conclusions  can properly be made.
Model 3 in Table 1 adds  our proxy for the level of intellectual  property rights OpRop)
to the benchmark  model. As the results  indicate,  intellectual  property  rights  protection  has  a
positive  effect  on economic  growth but is only marginally  sigrificant. still, the error is small
enough  so that intellectual  property rights  do contribute  to the explanatory  power of the1_)
equation.  In model 4, its significance  level falls only slightly when adding such variables as the
amount  of government  spending  as  proxied  by the average  ratio of real government
consumption  to real GDP [n(GovCon)], the degree  of political instability,  as  proxied  by the
number of revolutions  and coups  per year Iln(REV)], and the number of assassinations
Un(ASSN), and dummy  variables  for sub-saharan  Africa (AFRICA) and Latin America
(I-ATAM).'u
Figure 1 plots the average  yearly  growth  in real.GDP per capita  between  1960  and 1988
against (IPRoP),  holding constant all the explanatory variables in model 3.  That is, the figure
shows the partial correlation between growth rates and our proxy for inteliectual property riehts
protection.  The figure demonstrates  the positive relationship between growth and intellectual
property rights protection, but also shows  the large degree of variation in this relationship.
Problems with  measurement error
As mentioned  above,  the level  of patent  protection is, at best,  a rough measure  of the
theoretical  concept  of intellectual  property rights  protection. Undoubtedly,  measltrement  error
is possible because  constructing any general measure of intellectual property rights protection
requires  judgment. A common  way to address  this problem is to consider  our prory as  subject
to measurement error and use the instrumental variables technique of estimation.  The variables
used  must be correlated  with the independent  variable  they are instrumenting  for, and have  to
_ ^ 
*Because intellectual property rights are hypothesized to influence economic growth through
R&D, one can test whether  intellectual  property rights  protection  in the early 1960s  is
:orrelated to higher R&D spending  in the 1970s  and 19t0s. Although cross-iountry  data on
R&D is extremely  limited (only 48 countries  in recent  united Nations' world  Economic
s!rvgyE  and is subject to a large degree of error (much of the country data include public with
private spending  on R&D), we found that the simple  correlation 
"o"ffi"i"trt 
betweeripatent
protection and future R&D expenditures  as  a share  of GDp was  .504  (significant  at tle  .0001.
percent  level).
when R&D  as  a share  of GDP is included  in our basic  benchmark  model  with patent
protection,  it is significant  at the 10-percent  level,  while the significance  of patent  proteition
does  not change. The number of observations,  however,  is only 4g.14
be uncorrelated  with the primary regression's  error term. Several  variables  that may quali!, for
this role are the average  duration of patent  protection,  a set of dummy  variables  indicating  a
country's membership in an international convention that sets  guidetines for intellectual property
rights  protection  (e.g.,  the Paris Convention,  the Berne Convention,  and the International
convention  for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants), and a set of dummy variables
indicating whether a country has patents for pharmaceuticals,  petty patents, food products,
chemical products, plant/animal  varieties, surgical procedures, and microorganisms and fke
products.rT Other country-characteristic variables, such as government consumption.,  from the
primary regression equation are also included as instruments.'.
An  advantage  of using an IV  approach to deal with measurement error is that it is also a
method used to address  potential endogeneity problems.  These problems, however, are unlikely
to be significant because  the level of patent protection for most countries was measured in the
late 1950s  and early 1960s,  while the dependent  variable  is based  on later data.
Table 3 contains the IV  estimates for the four growth equations estimated in Table 1.
The data set is smaller because  the set of countries with data on the instruments is smaller.
When utilizing the IV  technique to address  the potential problems of measurement effot,  the
results show that intellectual property rights protection becomes  significant at the s-percent
level.  Moreoveq after controlling for the ancillary variables (model 3 versus model 4), the
significance level of intellectual property rights protection falls only slightly from the 5aercent
level to the 8-percent significance level.  However, although this is not a large drop in the
significance level, it does raise questions about the importance of intellectual property rights in
'TThese  data are from Siebeck  (1990).
'uThe  first stage  IV equations  are available  upon request. The variables  included  in the first
stage  equations  were solely  determined  on the basis  of whether  thev minimized the equation's
mean  souared  error.economic  growth. As suggested  by the empirical  work of Braga  and Willmore (1991),  a firm,s
development  of technolory  through R&D may  be directly  affected  by the degree  of foreign
competition. The following section  assesses  how our results  depend  on differences  in trade
regime.
Intellectual  property in open and closed trade regimes.
How do intellectual property rights influence growth in open and closed economies?
Although quite a few multicountry  studies have found that closed economies grow less tha.n
ourward-orientated  eronomies  (Krueger, 1978;  Bhagwati,  1978;  World Bank, 1987;  De Long and
Summers,  1991;  Michaely et a.1.,  .1991;  Edwards,  7992;  and  Roubini and Sala-i-Martin,  1992),  the
way in which intellectual property rights interact with the trade regime and growth has received
little attention.r'
All  studies face the problem of how to measure the degree of outward or inward
orientation.  surveys of business  opinion, the height of effective tariff  rates, black market
exchange  rate premia, enport shares,  the growth of e4port shares,  and real exchange  rate
distortions  have  all been  used  (world  Bank, 1991). No measure  is perfect  because  the true rate
of protection reflects a complicated combination of tariffs, quotas, exchange  rate controls, and a
host of administrative barriers.  we  present results based on trade regimes as defined by black
market exchange  rate premiums, real exchange  rate distortions, and a comprehensive  index of
trade orientation  based  on several  commonly  applied  indicators  of trade regime  used  in the
literature.'  Export shares  or the growth of export  shares  are not used  because  of potential
"Maskus and Penubarti  (1993)  find that trade flows are positively  related  to intellectual
propefty rights  protection,  although  they do not examine  the relationship  between  economic
growth and intellectual  property rights.
afhe index  was  created  by Gould and Ruffin (1994). Measures  of trade orientation  thar
contribute  to the index are: outward  orientation (syrquin and chenery, 19gg);  overall  trade
openness  and trade intervention  (Leamer, 1988);  trade orientation 1963-37  and  1973-g5  (world76
inference  problems. Export shares  reflect the size  of a country,  and the growth  of export  shares
is itself a complicated  endogenous  variable  reflecting  many  factors  in addition  to trade regime.'zl
We begin  with one of the most widely used  measures  of overall  trade orientation-black
market o<change  rate premiums.z  Countries with high black market exchange  rate premiums
are typically  highiy distorted  and inward oriented. As in De Long and Summers  (1991),  we
summarize the degree of trade orientation  by a zero-one dumrny variable.  We create the zero-
cine dummy variable because  black market exchange  rate premia, although they are good general
measures  of trade regime, cannot distinguish subtle differences in openness. This is not a
problem since we are only interested in a measure of relative openness. The dummy variable is
assigrred  zero for "open" economies-those with black market premiums greater than the median
of the sample-and  one for 'closed"  economies-those  with black  market premiums  less  than the
median  of the sample.
Table 4 presents the results on the role of intellectual property rights in open and closed
trade regimes. All  regressions  shown use the instrumental variables technique and the
instruments  discussed  earlier. Because  introduction of the trade orientation  variable
(BMPMED) reduces  the size  of the data set to 76 observations,  a reference  model of our
benchmark  growth equation  is estimated  with the 76-country  data set. In comparing  the
benchmark model 1 of rable  4 with the corresponding model 3 of rable  3, we see  that the signs
and magnitudes of the coefficients are all similar.  The proxy for inteliectual property rights
(ln(IPRoP)  is significant and the size of its coefficient changes  little.  This finding implies that
Bank Development  Repod, 1987);  effective  rate of protection (Barro, 1990);  black  market
premium (Levine and Renelt, 1992);  real exchange  rate distortion (Dollar, 1992);  and the ratio
of import taxes  to imports (Levine and Renelt, 1992).
21See  also  the comments  of De Long and Summers  (1991).
"Black market premium data  were obtained  from Levine and Renelt (1992)_LI
the original results  with respect  to intellectual  property  rights  are fairly robust  to the countries
chosen.
Model 2 of Table 4 includes  a term interacting intellectual  property rights and the trade
orientation  variable  [n(IPRoP)  * BMPMED], as  well as  intellectual  properry  rights [n(IpRop)]
by itself.  By including both variables in the estimating equation, the coefficient on In(IPROP)
represents the effects of intellectual property rights in relatively open trade regimes, and the
sum  of the coefficients  on |n(IPROP) and the interaction  term, [lnflpROp)  * BMPMED],
represent the effect of intellectual property rights in highly protected trade regimes.
Controlling for differences in trade regimes, we find that In(IPROP) continues to be
statistically significant, and its point estimate increases  by about 40 percent to l.zl7,  while the
-interaction  term itself is negative and insignificant.  By summing up the coefficients on
In(IPROP) and In(IPROP)  * BMPMED], we find that in relatively  closed  trade regimes  the
coefficient on intellectual property righs  is smaller, only 0.743. These results suggest  that
intellectual property rights may play a slightly larger role in open economies.
If we assume  a moderate  level of intellectual  property rights  protection of 4, the point
estimates  on |n(IPROP) and  In(IPROP)  * BMPMED] suggest  that growth induced  by
intellectual property rights protection is approximately 0.66  percentage  points higher per year in
open  versus  prote€ted  economies.  For example,  both Korea and Jamaica  have  an inde:<  of
intellectual property rights protection of 4, but Korea has much lower overall distortions than
Jamaica. Between  1960  and 1988,  annual  growth in per capita  income  was  5.6  percent  in Korea
versus  1.9  percent  in Jamaica. The results  suggest  that 0.66  percentage  points of this difference
may  be attributed to the interaction  between  openness  and patent  protection.
Figure 2 plots the partial correlation  between  growth  rates  and our proxy  for intellectual
property rights  protection (lPRoP)  in both open  and closed  trade  regimes. The figure shows18
how the relationship  between  growth and the level of intellectual  property rights  protection
varies  according  to trade regime. The more open  the economy,  the gr€ater  the role of
intellectual property rights protection and innovation in economic growth.
Model 3 includes  the zero-one  dummy  variable  (BMPMED) by itself to account  for shift
effects due to the trade regime.  The results confirm the previous findings. Intellectual property
rights are important  determinants of growth,  The growth effects, however, are slightly larger in
open trade regimes.
Of course, the positive relationship between growth, intellectual property rights, and
openness  may be sensitive to other factors correlated with trade regime and intellectual property
rights.  consequently, we include the ancillary vuri"61"s discussed  earlier: real gove6ment
consumption as a proportion  of real GDP (Govcon), and the degree of political  instability, as
proxied by the number of revolutions and coups per year (REv),  the number of assassinations
(ASSN), and Africa  (AI'RICA)  and Latin America  (I-ATAM)  dummy variables. After
controlling for these other factorg we continue to find that intellectuai property rights piay a
larger role in open trade regimes.
Because  the above results may be sensitive to measurement error in trade orientation,
we examine trade orientalion  as defined by two other criteria-real  exchange  rate distortions and
a composite trade regime inde,x.8 Like black market exchange  rate premia, countries with high
real exchange  rate distortions are typically highly distorted and inward-oriented.  The advanrage
of real exchange  rate distortions is that they may be a more general measure of trade
orientation. Furthermore,  because  of data availability,  the data set e4pands  to 79 countries.
Table 5 shows  the results  corresponding  to those  in Table  4 using  Dollar's (1992)
'The  real exchange  rate distortion data are averaged  over 1976-19g5  and  were from Dollar
(1992). The composite  trade regime  index  data were-Gould  and Ruffin (1994). Real  effective
rates  of protection  were also  used  and strongly  confirm the present  resulis.19
measure  of trade orientation. (RERMED)  is a zero-one  dummy  variable  that is equal  to one
for countries  that have  a real exchange  rate distortion greater  than the median  of the sample.
These  countries  are considered  relatively  closed  trade regimes.
Model 2 of Table 5 shows  results  similar to those  found earlier. Our prory for
intellectual property rights continues to be significant and positively related to economic growth
in open trade regimes but is less important  in closed trade regimes. For this definition  of trade
regime,  the point estimate  on In(IPROP) implies  that 
1n 
open  economy  with a moderate  level  of
intellectual property rights protection of 4 grew about 1.4 percentage  points faster than a closed
economy  with the same  level of intellectual property rights protection, all else equal.  Models 3
and 4 indicate that the results of model 2 are robust to shifts effects of trade regime,
government consumption e4penditures,  political  assassinations  and revolutions, and regional
dummies.
Table 6 shows  the results of the same e4periment as conducted in Tables 4 and 5, with
the measure  of trade orientation  as defined  by the composite  index  of trade regime  indicators.
The dummy variable (TRD)  is assigned  zero for open economies-those countries above the
median index value for openness--arnd  one for closed economies-those countries below the
median index value for openness.! The results are similar to those in the other tables and are
even stronger than previously estimated.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the average  yearly growth in real GDP per capita for open and
zFor each  trade  regime  variable  that is a component  of this index  (see  footnote 1B),
countries  are ranked according  to quartiles. Countries  that are the least  outward  oriented,  or
most  protected,  will fall into the first quartile and are assigned  a value  of one. Countries  in the
second  quartile are assigned  a value of two, and likewise  for the third and forth quartiles. The
new aggregate  trade regime index is calculated by averaging quartile values for each country.
For example,  if a country  has  two indicators  suggesting  it is in the third quartile and one
indicator suggesting  it is in the forth quartile,  the new indicator takes  a value of 3.333
(3.333  =  (3  +3  +4)/3).20
closed  trade regime,  as defined  by real exchange  rate distortions  and composite  index  of trade
regime indicators. The results  are consistent  with those  shown  in Figure 2 and indicate  that the
effects  of intellectual  property rights on growth  vary according  to trade  regime.
V. Conclusion
We find that a nation's trade policy may have important implications for its appropriate
intellectual property policy.  The more open an economy,  the greater are the benefits of
stronger intellectual property rights protection.
These results have broader implications.  In particular, the findings suggest  that the
implications  of some  endogenous  growth theories--those  that model innovation-may  be sensitive
to a country's market structure.  This is what one would expect given the importance of the
profit  motive's role in innovation as economic behavior is fundamentally different in competitive
versus  non-competitive  environments.
Under a system of relatively closed markets, we might e4pect  exogenous  technolory
shocks  to be more important  in determining economic growth.  In highly protected,
uncompetitive markets, agents are unlikely to innovate much themselves,  perhaps preferring to
spend  their resources  on legislative  schemes  to presewe  their market shares. Conversely,  under
a regime of open markets, we might expect competitive forces to motivate innovation and
intellectual  property protection to induce  even  more of it.Data Source  Appendix
ReaI  per capita  GDP growth:  Least  squares  estimates  of real per capita  GDp growth.
Source  of primary data:  Summers  and Heston  (1991).
Y60:  Real per capita  gross  domestic  product in 1960.  Source:
Summers  and Heston  (1991).
I/Y:  lnvestment  as  a share  of GDP, 1960-1989.  Source:  World
Bank National Accounts.
SEC:  Secondary  school  enrollment  rates,  1960-1989.  Source:
Barro  (1991).  i
LIT60:  Literacy rates  in 1960.  Source:  United Nations  (1971).
IPRoP:  Level of patent protection.  Source:  Rapp and Rozek
(1ee0).
BMPMED:  Dummy variable for black market premium greater than
.  the median of the sample.  Source  of primary data:  Levine
and  Renelt  (  1992).
RERMED:  Dummy variable for real exchange  rate distortion greater
then the median of the sample. Source of primary data:
Dollar  (1992).
TRD:  Dummy variable for comprehensive  trade index greater
than the median of the sample. Source: Gould and Ruffin
(1ee4).
GovCon:  Government  consumption  share  of gross  domestic  product.
Source:  Levine and Renelt (1992).
ASSN:  Number of assassinations  per year.  Source:  Barro (1991).
REV:  Number of revolutions  and coups  per year.  Source:  Barro
(19e1).
AFRICA:  Dummy variable  for sub-saharan  African countries.
LATAM:  Dummy variable  for Latin American countries.
Patent  coverage  Source:  Siebeck  (1990).
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Grolrth  and the Role of Intellectual  Property Rights
Instmmental Variables  Estimation


















































































NOTE:  T-statistics  in parentheses.  fisignificant at the 5Vo  level. rSirrrificant  ar the 10%  Ievel.Table 4
Growth:  The Role of Intellectual  Properfy Rights and Ttade Regime
(Black Market  Prerniurn > Median of Sample = Closed Regime)
Instrumental  Variables Estimation



































































































NOTE:  T-statistics  in parentheses.  nsignificant  at the sEo  level. rSignificant  at the 10%  level.Table 5
Growth:  The Role of Intellectual  Property Rights and Tfade Regime
(Real Exchange  Rate Distortion  > Median of Sample = Closed Regime)
Instrumental Variables  Estimation



































































































Gro$thi  The Role of Intellectual  Property Rights and Trade Regime
(Composite Trade Regime Index)
Instrumental Variables  Estimation
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